https://www.voanews.com/a/china-5g-network-security-concerns/4842952.html
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA —
Michael R. Wessel is a commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a U.S. government organization that investigates the national security implications of trade and economic relationship between the U.S. and China.
He recently discussed with VOA his concerns about China’s race to 5G, the next generation of wireless connectivity being built worldwide. With a 5G network, users will be able to send and receive more data in less time, which could have implications for self-driving cars, smart cities and other technologies.
Q: How much does it matter which country is first to fully functioning 5G?
Wessel: It does matter. First mover advantage is crucial in any new technology, but it is particularly important in 5G because it is foundational for cutting-edge innovation and applications including smart cities, network manufacturing, and integrated warfighting capability.
When standards are created, controlled, and sold by other countries, there is enhanced pressure on the U.S. to adopt those standards, which would have significant economic and national security costs.
For example, U.S. 4G leadership contributed to around $125 billion in U.S. company revenue from abroad and more than $40 billion in U.S. application and content developer revenue, and created 2.1 million new jobs from 2011-2014. And, from a national security perspective, the "control" of technologies raises
Q: How far ahead is Huawei or China on 5G?
Wessel: China's leadership in 5G depends on how we define competition. Some U.S. companies are already offering 5G devices and are running pilot projects in select cities, so they have beat China to the punch. However, Chinese investment into 5G is vast.
As of early February 2019, Huawei owned 1,529 "standard-essential" 5G patents, the most of any company, according to data-analytics firm IPlytics. By comparison, Qualcomm, a U.S. company, owned 787 standard-essential patents. All Chinese companies together own 36 percent of all 5G standard-essential patents, while U.S. companies (Intel and Qualcomm) own 14 percent.
In terms of 5G network build out, China is also racing ahead: China Tower, a monopoly created by the Chinese government to build the country's 5G infrastructure, said it would likely cover the country by 2023. One estimate said China Tower built more sites in 3 months than U.S. did in 3 years. In the United States, the process is likely to take much longer, with each company handling its own networks, and will need to negotiate with local governments for tower locations.
Q: The U.S. is urging its allies to not work with Huawei in building their 5G networks out of concern that the Chinese technology giant could give the Chinese government access to the new network for spying. Some countries such as Germany say they won’t rule out working with Huawei. Why is this a problem for the U.S.?
Wessel: We tend to focus on the economic cost and not consider the national security cost of something as significant as a nationwide 5G network rollout.
Huawei products, services and activities have already raised significant concerns and our allies have to consider how much more investment they are willing to make into their technology.
No amount of risk mitigation or false attempts at transparency are adequate. The problem is Germany and other allies have already incorporated some Huawei equipment into their tech infrastructure. Much like a virus, our allies can choose to inoculate themselves against this danger now, or run the risk of painful and costly treatment later. Unfortunately, this is a great risk to intelligence-sharing among allies and partners.
[엄청 매콤한][영자신문: 구조분석] 시작합니다.
대상: 5G가 뭐요?
5G하면 요금 오르는거 아녀??
[해석]
michael. R. wessel은 미중 간 무역과 경제 관계의 국가안보적 의미를 조사하는 미 정부 기구인 미-중 경제안보 검토위원회 위원입니다.
그는 최근 전 세계적으로 구축되고 있는 차세대 무선 연결인 5G로의 중국의 경쟁에 대해 VOA와 논의했습니다. 5G 네트워크를 통해 사용자는 보다 짧은 시간에 더 많은 데이터를 주고받을 수 있게 되며, 이는 자율주행차, 스마트시티 및 기타 기술에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.
Q: 어느 나라가 먼저 5G를 완벽하게 작동하느냐가 얼마나 중요합니까?
Wessel: 그건 중요해요. 어떤 신기술에서도 퍼스트 무버의 이점은 중요하지만, 스마트 시티, 네트워크 제조, 통합 전투 능력을 포함한 최첨단 혁신 및 애플리케이션을 위한 기반이기 때문에 5G에서는 특히 중요합니다.
다른 나라들에 의해 표준이 만들어지고, 통제되고, 팔릴 때, 그러한 기준을 채택하라는 미국의 압력이 강화되는데, 이는 상당한 경제적, 국가 안보 비용을 초래할 것입니다.
예를 들어, 미국 4G 리더십은 해외에서 약 1,250억 달러의 미국 회사 매출과 미국의 애플리케이션 및 콘텐츠 개발업체 매출 400억 달러 이상을 기여했으며, 2011-2014년부터 210만 개의 새로운 일자리를 창출했습니다. 그리고 국가 안보적 관점에서 기술의 '통제'가 높아집니다.
Q: 5G에서는 화웨이나 중국이 얼마나 앞서 있습니까?
wessel: 중국의 5G 리더십은 우리가 경쟁을 어떻게 정의하느냐에 달려 있습니다. 일부 미국 기업들은 이미 5G 기기를 내놓고 있고, 선별된 도시에서 시범사업을 벌이고 있어 중국을 제치고 펀치를 날렸습니다. 하지만 5G에 대한 중국 투자는 방대합니다.
데이터 분석 회사인 IPlytics에 따르면, 화웨이는 2019년 2월 초 현재 1529개의 "표준필수" 5G 특허를 보유하고 있으며, 이는 모든 회사 중 가장 많은 것입니다. 이에 비해 미국 퀄컴은 표준필수 특허 787건을 보유했습니다. 모든 중국 기업이 5G 표준 필수 특허 중 36%를 보유하고 있으며, 미국 기업(Intel 및 Qualcomm)은 14%를 보유하고 있습니다.
5G 네트워크 구축 측면에서 중국 역시 앞서가고 있습니다: 중국 정부가 중국의 5G 인프라를 구축하기 위해 만든 독점기업인 차이나 타워는 2023년까지 한국을 커버할 것이라고 말했습니다. 한 추정치는 차이나 타워가 3년 동안 미국의 부지보다 3개월 만에 더 많은 부지를 건설했다고 말했습니다. 미국에서는 각 업체가 자체 네트워크를 취급하는 등 절차가 훨씬 더 오래 걸릴 것으로 보여, 타워 위치 등을 놓고 지자체들과 협상이 필요할 것으로 보입니다.
Q: 미국은 중국 기술 거인인 화웨이가 중국 정부에 새로운 첩보망에 접근할 수 있다는 우려로 화웨이와 협력하지 말 것을 촉구하고 있습니다. 독일 등 일부 국가는 화웨이와의 협력을 배제하지 않겠다고 밝혔습니다. 이게 왜 미국에게 문제가 되는 거죠?
Wessel: 우리는 경제적 비용에 초점을 맞추고 국가 안보 비용을 전국적인 5G 네트워크 구축만큼 중요하게 생각하지 않는 경향이 있습니다.
Huawei 제품, 서비스 및 활동은 이미 상당한 우려를 불러일으켰으며, 우리의 동맹국들은 얼마나 더 많은 투자를 할 용의가 있는지 고려해야 합니다.
투명성에 대한 위험 완화 또는 잘못된 시도는 아무리 강조해도 부족합니다. 문제는 독일과 다른 동맹국들이 이미 일부 화웨이 장비를 기술 인프라에 통합했다는 점입니다. 바이러스와 마찬가지로, 우리의 동맹국들도 지금 이 위험에 대해 예방접종을 하거나, 나중에 고통스럽고 비용이 많이 드는 치료의 위험을 무릅쓸 수 있습니다. 불행하게도, 이는 동맹국들과 파트너들 간의 정보 공유에 큰 위험이 됩니다.
[구조분석]
(S)/ (V)/ (O)/ (pre+N)/ (to v)/ (의미상O)/
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA — Michael R. Wessel(S)/ is(V)/ a commissioner (SC)/of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (pre+N)/, a U.S. government organization (N)/[(관계사:A)/ that investigates(V)/ the national security implications(O)/ of trade and economic relationship (pre+N)/between the U.S. and China.(pre+N)/
He (S)/recently discussed(V)/ with VOA(pre+N)/ his concerns(O)/ about China’s race to 5G(pre+N)/, the next generation (N)/of wireless(pre+N)/ connectivity being(ing)/ built (PP)/ worldwide(의미상O)/. With a 5G network(pre+N)/, users (S)/ will be able to send(조동사+V)/ and (등위접속사)/ receive(to V)/ more data (O)/ in less time(pre+N)/, [(관계사:A)/ which could have (조동사+have)/ implications(O)/ for self-driving cars, smart cities and other technologies (pre+N)/.
Q: How much (의문사)/ does(조동사)/ it(S)/ matter(V)/ [(접속사)/ which country (S)/ is(V)/ first (SC)/to fully functioning 5G(pre+N)/?
Wessel: It(S)/ does matter(V)/. First mover advantage(S)/ is(V)/ crucial(SC)/ in any new technology(pre+N)/, but(등위접속사)/ it(S)/ is(V)/ particularly important(SC)/ in 5G(pre+N)/ because it(S)/ is(V)/ foundational(SC)/ for cutting-edge innovation(pre+N)/ and applications(pre+N)/ including(ing)/ smart cities, network manufacturing, and integrated warfighting capability.(의미상O)/
When standards(S)/ are created(be+PP)/, controlled(PP)/, and sold(PP)/ by other countries(pre+N)/, there is(V)/ enhanced pressure(S)/ on the U.S.(pre+N)/ to adopt (to V)/ those standards(의미상O)/,[(관계사:A)/ which would have(조동사 +V)/ significant economic and national security costs(O)/.
For example, U.S. 4G leadership (S)/contributed (V)/to around $125 billion(pre+N)/ in U.S. company revenue(pre+N)/ from abroad(pre+N)/ and more than $40 billion(pre+N)/ in U.S. application(pre+N)/ and (등위접속사)/ content developer revenue(N)/ , and created(V)/ 2.1 million new jobs (O)/ from 2011-2014(pre+N)/ . And, from a national security perspective(pre+N)/ , the "control" of technologies(S)/ raises(V)/
Q: How far ahead(의문사)/ is (V)/ Huawei or China(S)/ on 5G(pre+N)/ ?
Wessel: China's leadership(S)/ in 5G(pre+N)/ depends(V)/ on how we define competition(pre+간접의문문)/ . Some U.S. companies(S)/ are already offering(be+ing)/ 5G devices(의미상O)/ and (등위접속사)/ are running(be+ing)/ pilot projects(의미상O)/ in select cities(pre+N)/ , [(접속사)/ so they(S)/ have(V)/ beat China to the punch(O)/ . However, Chinese investment (S)/ into 5G(pre+N)/ is(V)/ vast(SC)/ .
As of early February 2019, Huawei (S)/ owned (V)/ 1,529 "standard-essential" 5G patents(O)/ , the most of any company, according to data-analytics firm IPlytics(pre+N)/ . By comparison, Qualcomm(pre+N)/ , a U.S. company(S)/ owned (V)/ 787 standard-essential patents(O)/ . All Chinese companies together (S)/ own(V)/ 36 percent (O)/ of all 5G standard-essential patents(pre+N)/ ,[(접속사)/ while U.S. companies (Intel and Qualcomm)(S)/ own (V)/ 14 percent(O)/ .
In terms of 5G network build out(pre+N)/ , China(S)/ is also racing(be+ing)/ ahead(ad)/: China Tower(S)/, [(삽입절)/ a monopoly (N)/ created (PP)/by the Chinese government(pre+N)/ to build(to V)/ the country's 5G infrastructure(의미상O)/,] said(V)/ [(접속사)/it (S)/would likely cover(V)/ the country(O)/ by 2023(pre+N)/. One estimate (S)/said(V)/ [(접속사)/ China Tower (S)/built (V)/more sites (O)/in 3 months than U.S(pre+N)/. did(V)/ in 3 years(pre+N)/. In the United States(pre+N)/, the process(S)/ is likely to take(V)/ much longer(O)/, with each company(pre+N)/ handling(ing)/ its own networks(의미상O)/, and will need(V)/ to negotiate(to V)/ with local governments(pre+N)/ for tower locations(pre+N)/.
Q: The U.S.(S)/ is urging(V)/ its allies(O)/ to not work(to V)/ with Huawei(pre+N)/ in building(pre+N)/ their 5G networks(의미상O)/ out of concern (pre+N)/ [(접속사)/ that the Chinese technology giant(S)/ could give(V)/ the Chinese government(IO)/ access(DO)/ to the new network (pre+N)/for spying(pre+N)/]. Some countries (S)/such as Germany(pre+N)/ say (V)/ [(접속사)/ they(S)/ won’t rule(V)/ out working (pre+N)/with Huawei(pre+N)/. Why(의문사)/ is(V)/ this a problem(S)/ for the U.S.(pre+N)/?
Wessel: We (S)/tend(V)/ to focus(to V)/ on the economic cost (pre+N)/and (등위접속사)/ not consider(to V)/ the national security cost(의미상O)/ of something(pre+N)/ as significant as (원급비교급)/ a nationwide 5G network rollout.
Huawei products, services and activities(S)/ have already raised (have+PP)/significant concerns(O)/ and(등위접속사)/ our allies (S)/have to consider(조동사+V)/ [(간접의문문)/ how much more investment(의문사)/ they (S)/are willing(be+ing)/ to make(to V)/ into their technology(pre+N)/.
[No amount of risk mitigation or false attempts at transparency](S)/are (V)/adequate(SC)/. The problem(S)/ is(V)/ [(접속사)/Germany and other allies(S)/ have already incorporated(have+PP)/ some Huawei equipment(O)/ into their tech infrastructure(pre+N)/. Much like a virus, our allies(S)/ can choose(V)/ to inoculate(to V)/ themselves(의미상O)/ against this danger now(pre+N)/, or(등위접속사)/ run(V)/ the risk(O)/ of painful(pre+N)/ and (등위접속사)/ costly treatment (N)/later. Unfortunately, this(S)/ is(V)/ a great risk(SC)/ to intelligence-sharing (pre+N)/among allies and partners(pre+N)/.
VIEW!. 오늘 오래간만에 VOA 했는데, 와..... 평소엔 쉽더니 오늘은 뭔....
[생각해볼 점]
중국에 관해선 할말하않
혹시 또 모르니......
그나저나, 한국은 특허를 얼마나 가지고 있을까요?